Financial Analysts Journal · 2008
Market structure now makes extreme price moves ever more likely, so applying past probabilities to markets is misguided, as Black Monday showed.
On the 20th anniversary of Black Monday, 19 October 1987, when the Dow fell from 2,246 to 1,738, almost 25%, John C. Bogle considers the role of risk and uncertainty in markets. Drawing on Frank Knight's distinction between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty and on Nassim Taleb's black swans, he argues that bell curves and Monte Carlo simulations give false confidence. Over the long run the economics of enterprise, dividends and earnings growth, determine returns, while speculation dominates the short run, inflated by a derivatives market far larger than the stocks beneath it. He ties these lessons to the subprime crisis then unfolding, with large write-downs at Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and HSBC.
For example, Alan (“Ace”) Greenberg, former chairman of Bear Stearns Companies, was quoted in the newspapers as saying, “So markets fluctuate.Show in the paper ›
Charles Prince, former chairman of giant Citigroup, said of the situation, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.Show in the paper ›
For Merrill Lynch, the write-down was even larger, $24.1 billion.Show in the paper ›