Common knowledge and coordination; why rituals and advertising work
Chwe, a political scientist, gives a game-theoretic account of why public rituals, ceremonies, advertising during mass audience events and mass media exist. His argument turns on common knowledge, meaning the situation in which everyone knows something, everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on without limit.
His claim is that coordination problems require common knowledge rather than merely shared knowledge. In a coordination problem each person wants to act only if enough others act, so knowing the fact yourself is insufficient; you must know that others know it, and that they know you know. Rituals solve this because participants see each other seeing. A circular seating arrangement, a public ceremony, a broadcast watched simultaneously by millions all generate common knowledge in a way that private communication of the same information does not.
He applies this across examples: the French Revolution's public festivals, royal progresses, religious ritual, the design of public squares, the pricing of Super Bowl advertising, and the difference between broadcast and targeted media. His treatment of advertising is the most cited: advertisers pay a premium for large simultaneous audiences partly because a product everyone knows everyone has seen is more valuable for goods whose worth depends on other people using them.
The book is short, formally rigorous and clearly written. Its limitation is that the mechanism, while genuinely explanatory, is presented as accounting for more of ritual's function than it plausibly does, and Chwe does not engage much with anthropological accounts that give other explanations.
Founders and marketers thinking about network effects, launch coordination and why broadcast advertising differs from targeted reach.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
