Lectures and commentary on reforming American financial regulation after the crisis.
This volume pairs lectures by Randall Kroszner and Robert Shiller, delivered as the Alvin Hansen Symposium at Harvard, with commentary from other economists including Benjamin Friedman and George Kaufman. Both principal authors address what should be done about American financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, and they disagree.
Kroszner, a former Federal Reserve governor and Chicago economist, examines the regulatory failures in terms of incentives and information. He is concerned with how supervision should work, with the treatment of systemically important institutions, with the moral hazard created by rescue expectations, and with the practical constraints regulators face. His approach is institutional and cautious about the capacity of regulation to anticipate problems.
Shiller argues from his standard position that financial innovation should be expanded rather than restricted, and that the correct response to the crisis is to build the institutions that would let households manage the risks they actually face: better mortgage contracts with automatic workout provisions, continuous workout mortgages, home equity insurance, and instruments to hedge house price and income risk. He treats the crisis as evidence of missing markets rather than of excessive innovation. The commentaries examine both positions. The volume is short, accessible, and useful mainly for seeing two credible positions on financial regulation stated against each other rather than in isolation.
Readers who want two credible and opposed positions on post-crisis financial regulation stated compactly against each other.
Sterling Professor of Economics Emeritus, Yale University; co-creator of the Case-Shiller home price indices; Nobel laureate in economics 2013
Excess-volatility work and Irrational Exuberance are the primary sources for the empirical case that asset prices move far more than fundamentals justify.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Whether a nation's banks are stable or crisis-prone is decided by its politics.
Why banks should fund themselves with far more equity, and why their objections fail.
How China's state-run financial system really works behind its official figures.
The 1933 Senate hearings exposing bankers' practices that led to securities laws.
“The combination of banking and investment banking under the same roof received a good part of the blame for the Great Crash (see one of my favorite books, Wall Street Under Oath by Ferdinand Pecora, 1939).” — Howard Marks
Source: The Long View, page 12
Recommended by: Howard Marks
A defence of finance, arguing that crises call for more financial innovation.
Life on Salomon Brothers' bond trading floor in the 1980s mortgage-bond boom.
“And then "Liar's Poker" from Michael Lewis, love that. I really like - I mythologize like Lewis Ranieri and all these guys when I read it.” — Chamath Palihapitiya
Source: Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya
Recommended by: Chamath Palihapitiya, Michael Burry and 5 others
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