Corporate Ownership in France

Murphy, an economic historian at Trinity College Dublin who has written extensively on John Law and on French financial history, produced this work on corporate ownership in France. The reference has not verified the book's contents.

The subject matters because French corporate ownership has historically differed from the Anglo-American pattern. Ownership has been more concentrated, with families, the state and cross-shareholdings among large firms holding controlling positions rather than dispersed public shareholders. The state has held direct ownership in large parts of industry and banking through successive nationalisations and privatisations. The noyaux durs, meaning hard cores of stable cross-holding shareholders, were deliberately created during the privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s to prevent foreign acquisition of newly private companies. Double voting rights for long-term holders, permitted under French law and later made the default under the Florange law, further concentrate control relative to economic ownership.

The historical dimension includes the development of the French financial system, the effect of the Law episode of 1720 on French attitudes to paper finance and to joint stock companies, the slow development of French equity markets relative to Britain's, and the role of state-directed credit in industrial development.

Murphy's own scholarship on John Law is the most substantial part of his published work, and readers wanting his major contribution should look there. This volume's specific coverage should be verified against its contents.