
AI framed as a fall in the cost of prediction; the standard economics treatment.
Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb, economists at Toronto's Rotman school, argue that recent advances in artificial intelligence should be understood as a drop in the cost of one specific input: prediction, meaning filling in missing information from existing information. Framing it this way lets standard economics answer the strategic questions.
The consequences follow from price theory. When the cost of something falls, use of it rises, and the value of its complements rises while the value of its substitutes falls. Prediction's complements are data, judgement about what to do with a prediction, and action. Its substitute is human prediction. So cheap prediction raises the value of judgement, meaning the specification of what outcomes are worth, which machines do not supply.
They decompose a task into prediction, judgement, data, action and outcome, and argue that automation happens task by task rather than job by job, so a job survives when its non-prediction components dominate. They also argue that cheap prediction changes what problems are worth solving at all: when prediction becomes cheap enough, problems that were not framed as prediction problems get reframed, which is how autonomous driving became tractable.
The strategic material covers where to position in the value chain, how to decide whether to build or buy, and the risks including data feedback loops and liability.
The book is short and the framing is genuinely clarifying. It predates large language models, whose capabilities extend beyond prediction as narrowly defined here, and readers should test whether the framework still contains what these systems do.
Executives and investors deciding where machine learning changes their business economics, using a framework that turns the question into price theory.
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