The Investor's Shelf — one book
Red-Blooded Risk

Red-Blooded Risk

Aaron Brown
2011
T3 432 pages · about 7h 12m to read OL21464034Wgoodreads

A working risk manager on what value-at-risk is and is not for.

Summary

Aaron Brown has worked as a risk manager at trading firms and banks, and this book combines a personal history of quantitative risk management with an argument about what risk management is for. It is unconventional in form, with digressions on the history of gambling, on money, and on the culture of the people who built the field.

His central position is that risk management exists to enable risk-taking rather than to reduce it. A firm that manages risk well can take more of it, in the places where it is paid to, because it knows what it holds. He is critical of the compliance-oriented risk function that produces reports nobody uses, and of the belief that value at risk failed in 2008. His argument on value at risk is that the number was never meant to describe tail losses; it is a measure of whether the firm's models are working, and a breach frequency higher than the stated confidence level tells you the model is wrong, which is the information it was designed to produce.

The technical content covers the Kelly criterion and optimal bet sizing, the distinction between money and risk as separate quantities to manage, the use of risk limits as a control on model error rather than on loss, and the behaviour of markets with fat tails. Brown writes informally and the structure wanders. The book is best read for its arguments about what risk numbers mean and how a risk function should relate to a trading business, which are rarely stated as clearly elsewhere.

Key takeaways 7

  1. Risk management exists to allow a firm to take more risk where it is paid to, not to reduce risk generally.
  2. Value at risk is a test of whether the firm's models are working, and its breach frequency is the information it produces.
  3. Money and risk are separate quantities, and confusing them produces position sizing that ignores one or the other.
  4. The Kelly criterion gives the growth-optimal bet size and explains why over-betting destroys capital even with a positive edge.
  5. A risk function that produces reports nobody acts on is a compliance exercise rather than risk management.
  6. Brown argues that risk limits should constrain exposure to model error rather than to any particular loss amount.
  7. Historical data is a weak guide to tail behaviour because the periods that matter are the ones with fewest observations.

Who should read it

Risk managers and traders who want an argument about what risk measures actually tell you and how the risk function should relate to a trading business.

Where it sits in the reference 2

Assets
Portfolio & risk

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