Galbraith argues that the large corporation had become the central institution of the American economy and that classical market theory no longer described how it operated. His central concept is the technostructure: the collective of managers, engineers, planners and specialists who actually make corporate decisions, as distinct from shareholders who own the firm and from any individual executive.
His claims follow from the requirements of modern production. Large-scale technology requires long lead times and enormous capital commitments, which makes uncertainty intolerable. The firm therefore plans: it manages demand through advertising, it secures supply through vertical integration and long-term contracts, it finances from retained earnings to avoid the discipline of capital markets, and it seeks accommodation with the state rather than opposing it. The technostructure's objective is not profit maximisation, which would serve shareholders, but growth and security, which serve the technostructure.
He argues this makes the large firm and the state converge, since both are planning organisations with similar personnel and objectives, and that the distinction between socialism and capitalism has less content than the political argument assumes.
The book was enormously influential and is now largely rejected. The conglomerates Galbraith described were broken up, the market for corporate control disciplined the technostructure exactly as he said it could not, shareholder value became the explicit objective, and consumer demand proved far less manipulable than his advertising argument required. It remains worth reading as the strongest statement of the managerialist position and because parts of the analysis apply again to firms with entrenched control structures.
Readers interested in the managerialist theory of the corporation and in an influential argument that the subsequent decades largely refuted.
Harvard economist, wartime price administrator and US ambassador to India; died in 2006.
The Great Crash 1929 is the standard narrative of the boom, the leverage stacked inside investment trusts and the collapse that followed, written close enough to the events to use the participants directly. A Short History of Financial Euphoria condenses four centuries of speculation into a recurring pattern of leverage, the belief that a familiar instrument is genuinely new, and very short memory.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.


