
Loans-for-shares and the privatisation that created the oligarchs.
Chrystia Freeland ran the Financial Times bureau in Moscow during the 1990s and wrote this account of Russian privatisation and the rise of the oligarchs. She had direct access to the reformers and to the businessmen, and the book is built on that reporting.
The narrative covers the Gaidar price liberalisation of 1992, the voucher privatisation programme run by Anatoly Chubais, the emergence of the banks that became the oligarchs' vehicles, and the loans-for-shares scheme of 1995 in which the state's most valuable industrial assets, including Norilsk Nickel, Yukos and Sibneft, were pledged as collateral for loans and then transferred to the lenders through auctions the lenders themselves administered. She then covers the 1996 presidential election, in which the oligarchs funded Yeltsin's re-election campaign against a communist opponent who was leading in the polls, and the settling of accounts afterward.
Freeland's argument is that the reformers made a deliberate choice to create a propertied class quickly, on the theory that owners would defend private property and prevent a communist restoration, and that this succeeded in its immediate political objective while producing an economy owned by people whose titles rested on a transaction most Russians considered theft. She is sympathetic to the reformers' intentions and clear about the consequences. The book stops in 2000 as Putin took office. Its account of loans-for-shares is the standard one and remains directly relevant to understanding contemporary Russian political economy.
Investors and analysts who need the origin of Russian corporate ownership and of the political vulnerability that still attaches to it.
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