The Sporty Game
Classic on the bet-the-company economics of airliner programs.
Summary
Newhouse, a New Yorker writer, examined the commercial aircraft industry and the extraordinary financial risk of developing a new airliner. The title comes from an industry phrase for the bet a manufacturer makes when it launches a programme.
The economics are the argument. Developing a new aircraft costs more than the manufacturer's net worth, takes years before any revenue arrives, and requires selling several hundred units before breaking even. A failed programme can destroy the company, and Newhouse documents cases where it nearly did. The result is an industry where each launch decision is a bet on the entire firm, where governments become involved because the employment and technology consequences are national, and where the number of manufacturers falls over time because each failure removes one permanently.
He covers the specific episodes: the Lockheed TriStar and the Rolls-Royce bankruptcy that accompanied it, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and its certification and safety history, Boeing's 747 gamble which nearly failed before the market appeared, the Concorde as a programme where national prestige overrode commercial logic, and the formation of Airbus as a state-backed consortium precisely because no European company could take the risk alone.
The book is from 1982 and the industry has consolidated to two manufacturers since, which is the conclusion the analysis points toward. The specific programmes are historical. The economics of a business where each product decision risks the firm remain the durable content and apply to other industries with the same structure.
Key takeaways 7
- Developing a new airliner costs more than the manufacturer's net worth and requires selling several hundred units before breaking even, which makes each launch a bet on the firm.
- The industry consolidates over time because each failed programme permanently removes a manufacturer, and no new entrants can raise the required capital.
- Governments become involved because the employment and technology consequences of a programme are national, which turns commercial decisions into political ones.
- Airbus was created as a state-backed consortium because no single European company could carry the development risk alone.
- Engine development is a parallel bet of similar magnitude, and Rolls-Royce's bankruptcy during the TriStar programme nearly destroyed both companies.
- Launch customers extract very favourable terms because their orders are what allow the programme to proceed at all.
- Concorde demonstrated that national prestige can sustain a programme that no commercial analysis would have approved.
Who should read it
Investors and operators in industries where individual product decisions risk the whole firm, and anyone studying aerospace industry structure.
Where it sits in the reference 4
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