
How antitrust shrank to a consumer price test, and the case for breaking up giants.
The counter-case, and the Brandeisian revival.
Wu, a law professor who coined the term net neutrality, argues that American antitrust law has been narrowed to a consumer welfare standard focused on price, that this narrowing was a deliberate intellectual project led by Robert Bork and the Chicago school, and that it abandoned the original purpose of the antitrust laws.
His historical argument is that the Sherman Act and its successors were passed for political reasons: to prevent concentrations of private power that could dominate government and remove economic independence from citizens. He traces this through Brandeis, whose phrase gives the book its title, through the trust-busting era, and through the mid-century enforcement that broke up or constrained AT&T, IBM and others. He argues that the technology industry's development was made possible by those interventions, since the AT&T consent decree released the transistor patents and the IBM case forced software to be sold separately.
His case against the current standard is that measuring harm by short-run consumer prices cannot detect harms to innovation, to labour, to suppliers or to political structure, and that free products defeat the test entirely.
His proposals include reviving merger review with structural presumptions, breaking up the largest technology platforms, and restoring a broader standard of harm.
The book is short and polemical. Economists in the antitrust field dispute both the historical claim about the statutes' purpose and the practical claim that a broader standard is administrable. The argument has since moved substantially toward Wu's position in enforcement practice, which makes the book a useful statement of where that shift came from.
Investors and operators in concentrated industries who need to understand the intellectual case behind the shift in antitrust enforcement.
“Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, and Roni Michaely, “Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?” Review of Finance, Vol. 23, No. 4, July 2019, 697-743 and Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018)”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Antitrust law should pursue one goal, consumer welfare, and drop the rest.
A political history of American monopoly and of the tradition that fought it.
“Matt Stoller, Goliath: The 100-Year War Between Monopoly Power and Democracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Market Share: Understanding Competitive Advantage Through Market Power, page 46
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, David Heinemeier Hansson
Antitrust should rest on the economics of efficiency, not on protecting competitors.
Market concentration in America, sector by sector, through the people it affects.
A defence of American business on fraud, CEO pay, monopoly and tech, issue by issue.
Every US information industry moved from an open era to control by one firm.
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