Going for Broke: Nick Leeson and the Collapse of Barings Bank
By a former Barings Tokyo employee.
Summary
The reference has not verified this book in detail; the summary states only what the title, author and subject establish.
Rawnsley, who had worked at Barings in Tokyo before becoming a journalist, wrote one of the first accounts of the bank's 1995 collapse.
Her position gives the book a particular perspective: she had worked inside the organisation, knew people involved, and could describe the culture of the bank and of its Asian operations from experience.
The established facts of the case are that Nick Leeson ran Barings Futures Singapore with responsibility for both trading and the back office; that he concealed losses in an error account excluded from reports to London; that he reported profits from what was described as low-risk arbitrage between the Singapore and Osaka exchanges while holding a large directional position including short options on the Nikkei; that the Kobe earthquake moved the market against him; that London funded margin calls exceeding the bank's capital without establishing what positions required them; and that the bank collapsed in February 1995 and was sold to ING for one pound.
Rawnsley's account, written within months of the collapse, covers the culture of the bank, the relationship between the traditional merchant banking side and the securities operation, the management structure that left no one clearly responsible for Singapore, and Leeson himself.
The book was written before the Bank of England's board of banking supervision report and before the Singapore inspectors' report, both of which established the documented record. Gapper and Denton's All That Glitters, also in this reference, is the more thorough account. This one is useful for the insider's description of the organisation's culture.
Key takeaways 7
- Leeson controlled both trading and settlement, which is the control failure that made concealment possible.
- Reported profits were implausible for the low-risk arbitrage strategy claimed and were not investigated because they were welcome.
- London funded margin calls exceeding the bank's entire capital without establishing what positions required the money.
- No single manager held clear responsibility for the Singapore operation, so warnings reached no one with authority.
- Tension between the traditional merchant banking side and the newer securities operation shaped how the business was overseen.
- The account was written within months of the collapse and before the official reports established the documented record.
- Two centuries of institutional history ended in a sale for a nominal sum.
Who should read it
Readers wanting a former employee's account of Barings' culture, using the official reports and later accounts for the documented record.
Where it sits in the reference 2
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