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The Antitrust Paradox

The Antitrust Paradox

Robert H. Bork
1978
T2 475 pages · about 7h 55m to read OL3289572Wgoodreads

The consumer-welfare argument that let network scale go unchallenged.

Summary

Bork, then a Yale law professor and later a federal judge, argued that American antitrust law had become incoherent because courts pursued multiple inconsistent goals, and that it should pursue one: consumer welfare, which he equated with allocative efficiency.

The paradox of his title is that antitrust enforcement as practised was making consumers worse off. Courts blocked mergers that would have produced efficiencies, condemned vertical arrangements that improved distribution, protected small competitors from more efficient rivals, and treated low prices as evidence of predation. Bork argued each of these harmed the consumers the law existed to protect.

His specific positions follow. Vertical restraints including resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing and territorial restrictions should be presumptively lawful, because a manufacturer has no incentive to reduce output at the retail level and such arrangements usually solve free-rider problems in distribution. Vertical integration rarely harms competition because a monopolist can extract its monopoly profit at one level and gains nothing from extending to another. Predatory pricing is almost never rational, because the predator loses more during the campaign than it can recover afterward, and so allegations of it should be viewed sceptically. Horizontal mergers should be permitted unless they create very high concentration, since efficiencies are common and entry disciplines pricing. Conglomerate mergers raise no competitive issue at all.

He supported this with an interpretation of the Sherman Act's legislative history as having been concerned with consumer welfare, which historians have disputed extensively.

The book's influence was enormous: the consumer welfare standard became the operative test in American antitrust for four decades. It is now under sustained attack from scholars arguing that price-focused analysis cannot address platform markets where the product is free, that concentration has risen across the economy with measurable harms to workers and suppliers, and that Bork's reading of the statute's history was wrong. Readers should treat it as a powerful statement of a position whose dominance is ending rather than as settled law.

Key takeaways 7

  1. Antitrust law should pursue consumer welfare alone, and pursuing multiple goals makes it incoherent and unpredictable.
  2. Protecting small competitors from more efficient rivals harms the consumers antitrust exists to serve.
  3. Vertical restraints usually solve distribution problems and rarely reduce output, so they should be presumptively lawful.
  4. A monopolist extracts its full monopoly profit at one level of the chain and gains nothing from integrating into another.
  5. Predatory pricing is rarely rational because the predator's losses during the campaign exceed what it can recoup afterward.
  6. Horizontal mergers generate efficiencies frequently enough that they should be permitted except at very high concentration.
  7. Low prices are evidence of competition working rather than of predation, and courts that treat them otherwise punish the outcome the law wants.

Who should read it

Founders, investors and operators facing competition questions who need the framework that governed American antitrust for forty years and the arguments now displacing it.

Where it sits in the reference 3

Business models
Business themes
Philosophy

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