
The 2008 crisis traced back 25 years to mortgage bonds, Fannie Mae and subprime.
Traces AIG Financial Products' swap book back to its origins.
McLean and Nocera trace the 2008 crisis back to the 1980s rather than to the housing bubble, following the institutions and individuals over twenty-five years: Lewis Ranieri's creation of the mortgage-backed securities market at Salomon, the growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under Jim Johnson, the subprime lenders including Household, Ameriquest and Countrywide, the credit default swap business at AIG Financial Products, the rating agencies, and the regulators who declined to act.
The argument is that the crisis required all of these to fail simultaneously and that each failure had a specific institutional cause. Fannie and Freddie used their implicit government guarantee to build enormous leveraged portfolios while lobbying successfully against any capital requirement that would constrain them. Rating agencies were paid by issuers and competed on the ratings they would assign. Subprime originators sold loans immediately and therefore had no exposure to their performance. AIG wrote credit protection with no reserve because the accounting treated it as insurance rather than as a derivative. Regulators, particularly the Federal Reserve under Greenspan, declined to use authority they possessed over mortgage underwriting standards.
The reporting is detailed and the authors are careful about apportioning responsibility, which distinguishes it from accounts that identify a single villain. It is the best available single-volume institutional history of the crisis. Its limitation is scope: the mechanics of the funding run and the policy response during 2008 itself get less attention than the origins, and readers wanting those should pair it with accounts focused on the crisis weeks.
Investors and risk managers who want the institutional origins of the 2008 crisis traced through the specific incentive failures at each participant.
Investigative business journalist; Vanity Fair contributing editor, formerly Fortune
The Smartest Guys in the Room remains the definitive account of Enron and her Fortune reporting broke the story before the collapse.
“Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis (New York: Portfolio, 2010), 128-134”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
How subprime lenders and Wall Street built the mortgage bubble and the crisis.
How the savings and loan crisis foreshadowed the mortgage crisis.
How subprime lenders such as Ameriquest and Wall Street fleeced borrowers.
Inside the meetings of bankers and regulators during the 2008 financial crisis.
“I thought Too Big to Fail was terrific, and Sorkin's newest book is just as thoroughly researched as his last one.” — Bill Gates
Source: My summer best list for 2026 — Gates Notes
Recommended by: Bill Gates, Mohnish Pabrai, Seth Klarman and 2 others
How AIG's derivatives unit led the world's largest insurer to a $180 billion rescue.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, from profitable giants to years in conservatorship.
As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.