
Inside the meetings of bankers and regulators during the 2008 financial crisis.
Crisis-wide narrative in which the AIG rescue is the central set piece.
Sorkin reconstructs the autumn of 2008 through the meetings, phone calls and negotiations among bank chief executives, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke and New York Fed president Tim Geithner. He drew on more than five hundred hours of interviews with nearly every principal, and the book is written as continuous narrative with reconstructed dialogue.
The sequence covers Bear Stearns and the JPMorgan purchase, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the weekend when Lehman Brothers failed after Barclays was blocked by British regulators and no buyer emerged, the AIG rescue two days later, the Merrill Lynch sale to Bank of America, the Reserve Primary Fund breaking the buck, the conversion of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to bank holding companies, and the forced capital injections into nine banks in October.
The book's contribution is the record of what individuals knew and decided in real time, including the inconsistency between letting Lehman fail and rescuing AIG, the personal antagonisms among the chief executives, and the improvisation involved in decisions later described as policy.
It is journalism rather than analysis. Sorkin does not explain the securitisation mechanics, the regulatory failures that preceded the crisis, or the economic consequences, and readers wanting those should go elsewhere. The reconstructed dialogue is a method that some historians object to. Sorkin's access came from the participants, which shapes the sympathies. It remains the most detailed account of what happened in those specific weeks and of how institutional failure looks from inside the room.
Investors and executives who want the hour-by-hour record of institutional decision-making under extreme time pressure during a systemic crisis.
New York Times columnist, founder and editor-at-large of DealBook; CNBC Squawk Box co-anchor
Too Big to Fail is the standard blow-by-blow reconstruction of the 2008 crisis and is cited across the crisis literature.
“I thought Too Big to Fail was terrific, and Sorkin's newest book is just as thoroughly researched as his last one.”
“Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail10 is fabulous, as is Roger Lowenstein’s The End of Wall Street.11 In fact, all of Roger Lowenstein’s books are excellent, and so we should read everything Roger has written.”
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