When a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure, because effort flows to the proxy rather than the thing. Earnings per share, same-store sales and user counts all decay this way once compensation is attached. The defence is to read any metric alongside the incentive that produced it.
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“Also, see the story of cheating in the Chicago Public School system in Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 23-35” — Michael Mauboussin
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