Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development
The founding pessimist study; useful baseline for what was later beaten.
Summary
The reference has not verified this book in detail; the summary states only what the title, author and subject establish.
Faaland and Parkinson wrote this in 1976, five years after Bangladesh's independence, and the title states their framing: if development could be achieved in Bangladesh, it could be achieved anywhere.
The reference has not verified the book's detailed contents. The context establishes what such an assessment addressed. Bangladesh at that point had among the lowest incomes in the world, extremely high population density on a flood-prone delta, an economy dependent on jute at a time when synthetic substitutes were displacing it, damaged infrastructure from the 1971 war, a famine in 1974, and a state with almost no administrative capacity. The prevailing assessment among development economists and aid agencies was pessimistic, and some considered the country's situation hopeless.
The authors examined the constraints: land and population, agricultural productivity, the industrial base, the availability of foreign exchange, aid dependence and administrative capacity, and set out what would be required.
The subsequent record is the reason the book is worth noting. Bangladesh achieved sustained growth, reduced poverty substantially, and improved health and education indicators faster than most countries at comparable income levels, through garment manufacturing, agricultural productivity growth, remittances and a very large non-governmental service delivery sector. The pessimistic consensus of the 1970s was wrong.
The book is therefore of historical interest as a record of what informed observers believed at the time, and as a caution about confident assessments of a country's prospects.
Key takeaways 6
- Bangladesh in 1976 was treated by development economists as the hardest case, with some considering its situation hopeless.
- The constraints identified were population density, agricultural productivity, dependence on a declining jute export and negligible administrative capacity.
- The 1974 famine and the war damage shaped the pessimistic assessment of the period.
- The pessimistic consensus proved wrong, and the country subsequently achieved sustained growth and substantial poverty reduction.
- Confident expert assessments of a country's long-run prospects have a poor record, which this case demonstrates directly.
- The eventual sources of growth, including garment manufacturing and a large non-governmental service sector, were not anticipated in the analysis of the period.
Who should read it
Readers interested in the history of development thinking and in how badly informed forecasts about national prospects can go wrong.
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