
Why aviation learns from every failure while fields like medicine hide theirs.
Syed contrasts two professional cultures. Aviation investigates every accident and near miss through an independent body, publishes the findings, and requires that the resulting changes be adopted across the industry, with data from every flight recorded automatically. Healthcare, by contrast, treats errors as individual failures, conceals them under litigation exposure, and does not systematically collect or share the information that would prevent repetition.
His argument is that the difference in outcomes follows from the difference in how failure is treated, and that the aviation approach is available to any field that chooses it. The supporting material covers specific aviation cases including United 173, which ran out of fuel while the crew addressed a landing gear problem and which produced crew resource management training, and specific medical cases including the death of Elaine Bromiley during a routine procedure, investigated by her husband, an airline pilot.
He extends the argument to criminal justice, where he documents prosecutors refusing to accept DNA exonerations because accepting them requires accepting that they convicted an innocent person, and to business, where he covers randomised testing, marginal gains in cycling under Dave Brailsford, and the difference between organisations that run experiments and those that rely on the judgment of senior people.
His general claim is that a closed loop, in which failure is explained away rather than investigated, is what prevents learning, and that the explanation is usually available and psychologically comfortable. The cognitive dissonance material overlaps heavily with Tavris and Aronson. Syed is a journalist and the cases are selected. The aviation and healthcare comparison is the strongest evidence and is well documented.
Leaders designing how their organisation handles failure, wanting the aviation comparison and the specific mechanisms that make investigation work.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
A 20-year test of 28,000 expert forecasts: foxes with many models beat hedgehogs.
“All pundits and commentators should publish their prediction track records, yet don't. What to pay attention to and what to ignore.” — Marc Andreessen
Source: @pmarca, 'Thread: Books I've recently read and recommend'
Recommended by: Marc Andreessen, Michael Mauboussin and 2 others
Why people mistake luck for skill, above all in markets.
“Fooled By Randomness was unquestionably the best non-fiction book I read in 2005.” — Brad Feld
Source: Book Review: Fooled By Randomness — Feld Thoughts
Recommended by: Barton Biggs, Brad Feld, Derek Sivers and 15 others
Why people misjudge, with thinking tools from Munger, Buffett, Darwin and Feynman.
“…books I've recommended, highlighted to death, or forced on friends.” — Andrew Wilkinson
Source: Andrew Wilkinson's Bookshelf, neverenough.com
Recommended by: Andrew Wilkinson, David Perell, Derek Sivers and 9 others
What a four-year forecasting tournament showed about the best forecasters' habits.
“In a book many in our research department have enjoyed, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction, Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner state: “The humility required for good judgment is not self-doubt—the sense that you are untalented, unintelligent, or unworthy.” — Bill Nygren
Source: Bill Nygren Market Commentary | 1Q17
Recommended by: Bill Nygren, Mark Leonard and 11 others
How fast, automatic thought and slow, deliberate thought shape judgment and error.
“…books I've recommended, highlighted to death, or forced on friends.” — Andrew Wilkinson
Source: Andrew Wilkinson's Bookshelf, neverenough.com
Recommended by: Andrew Wilkinson, Charles de Vaulx and 36 others
How the wish for agreement in close groups led to fiascos like the Bay of Pigs.
“Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Building an Effective Team: How to Manage a Team to Make Good Decisions, page 17
Recommended by: Adam Weiss, Barton Biggs, Michael Mauboussin
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