Corporate Ownership in France
Cross-holdings, the state and who actually controls French companies.
Summary
The reference has not verified this book in detail; the summary states only what the title, author and subject establish.
Murphy, an economic historian at Trinity College Dublin who has written extensively on John Law and on French financial history, produced this work on corporate ownership in France. The reference has not verified the book's contents.
The subject matters because French corporate ownership has historically differed from the Anglo-American pattern. Ownership has been more concentrated, with families, the state and cross-shareholdings among large firms holding controlling positions rather than dispersed public shareholders. The state has held direct ownership in large parts of industry and banking through successive nationalisations and privatisations. The noyaux durs, meaning hard cores of stable cross-holding shareholders, were deliberately created during the privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s to prevent foreign acquisition of newly private companies. Double voting rights for long-term holders, permitted under French law and later made the default under the Florange law, further concentrate control relative to economic ownership.
The historical dimension includes the development of the French financial system, the effect of the Law episode of 1720 on French attitudes to paper finance and to joint stock companies, the slow development of French equity markets relative to Britain's, and the role of state-directed credit in industrial development.
Murphy's own scholarship on John Law is the most substantial part of his published work, and readers wanting his major contribution should look there. This volume's specific coverage should be verified against its contents.
Key takeaways 6
- French corporate ownership has been concentrated among families, the state and cross-shareholdings rather than dispersed among public shareholders.
- Cross-holding blocks were deliberately created during privatisations to prevent foreign acquisition of newly private companies.
- Double voting rights for long-term holders concentrate control relative to economic ownership under French law.
- State ownership through successive nationalisations and privatisations has been a persistent feature of French industry and banking.
- The 1720 Law episode shaped French attitudes to paper finance and to joint stock companies for generations afterward.
- French equity markets developed more slowly than Britain's, which is connected to the state's role in directing credit.
Who should read it
Readers researching French corporate governance and ownership structures, verified against the book's actual coverage.
Similar books 6
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Harvard case studies in bankruptcy and workout situations.
On direct listings and the alternatives to the traditional IPO, SPACs included.
Recommended by: Mohnish Pabrai
Blackstone from its 1985 founding through its 2007 public offering and the crisis.
Recommended by: Mohnish Pabrai
KKR from 1976 through the RJR Nabisco buyout, and what debt did to its companies.
John Law, the Mississippi bubble and the invention of paper money in France.
Where it sits in the reference 2
Topics