From Solidarity to Sellout
The critique of the transition's distributional cost.
Summary
Kowalik, a Polish economist who had advised Solidarity during its formation and who had been part of the reform economics tradition, wrote a critical account of the Polish transition.
His argument is that the transition betrayed the movement that made it possible. Solidarity in 1980 and 1981 was a workers' movement demanding self-management, workplace democracy and a socialised economy under worker control, and its programme documents said so. What was implemented after 1989 was a rapid liberalisation and privatisation programme designed by a small group of economists and advisers, which produced mass unemployment, sharply increased inequality, and the transfer of enterprises to managers, foreign investors and connected parties rather than to the workers whose movement had brought down the previous system.
He attacks the Balcerowicz programme specifically: the price liberalisation combined with a wage control mechanism that suppressed wages while prices rose, the monetary tightening that produced a deeper contraction than necessary, the exchange rate policy, and the sequencing that opened the economy before domestic firms could compete. He argues that a slower transition with worker ownership and stronger social protection was available and was rejected for ideological reasons.
He also examines the outcome: unemployment that persisted for years, regions where the closure of a single enterprise removed the local economy, and an inequality increase from a very low starting point.
Kowalik writes from an explicitly social democratic position and against the consensus among Polish economists. Piatkowski's Europe's Growth Champion, also in this reference, presents the favourable account of the same period. Poland's aggregate record over three decades is the strongest response to Kowalik, though the distributional and regional points he raises are supported by the evidence and connect to the subsequent political reaction.
Key takeaways 7
- Solidarity's own programme demanded worker self-management and a socialised economy, not the liberalisation that followed.
- The transition programme was designed by a small group of economists and advisers rather than by the movement that made it possible.
- Price liberalisation combined with wage suppression transferred income from workers during the adjustment.
- Monetary tightening produced a deeper contraction than the stabilisation required.
- Enterprises were transferred to managers, foreign investors and connected parties rather than to workers.
- Unemployment persisted for years and was concentrated in regions where a single enterprise had been the local economy.
- A slower transition with worker ownership and stronger protection was available and was rejected on ideological grounds.
Who should read it
Readers who want the critical account of the Polish transition from a participant in the movement that preceded it, read against the favourable assessments.
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Where it sits in the reference 2
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