
Long-Term Capital Management's actual positions, and the option theory behind them.
More technical on the trades and the option-pricing lineage.
Nicholas Dunbar covered derivatives for Risk magazine, and he writes about Long-Term Capital Management with more technical detail about the actual positions than any other account of the episode. Roughly the first half is intellectual history: Bachelier, the development of option pricing by Black, Scholes and Merton, the growth of the swap market, and the spread of arbitrage pricing methods through the trading desks of the 1980s.
The second half covers the fund itself, from its founding by John Meriwether in 1994 through the collapse and Federal Reserve-organised recapitalisation in September 1998. Dunbar explains the trades: convergence positions in European government bonds ahead of monetary union, swap spread trades, on-the-run against off-the-run Treasuries, the Royal Dutch and Shell pair, merger arbitrage, and the large short position in long-dated equity index volatility that the fund built as its capital base grew. He shows how each individual position was defensible and how the portfolio as a whole amounted to a single bet that liquidity premia would narrow.
Dunbar's argument is that the models were not the failure. The fund's own risk system reported the positions accurately given its assumptions about correlation and about the availability of financing. What the system did not capture was that other desks had copied the same trades, that the fund's size meant it could not exit without moving prices against itself, and that its lenders would withdraw collateral terms precisely when the marks moved. Roger Lowenstein's When Genius Failed covers the same events with more character and less mathematics, and the two complement each other. Dunbar wrote before the 2008 crisis demonstrated the same mechanism at much larger scale.
Investors and risk managers who want the position-level mechanics of the best-documented leveraged relative-value blow-up, rather than a narrative of the personalities.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
The official report on why Long-Term Capital Management failed.
How a hedge fund's bond bets on borrowed money lost $4.6 billion in four months.
“Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management (New York: Random House, 2000), 72” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: A Tail of Two Worlds: Fat Tails and Investing, page 4
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How financial innovation made markets more crisis-prone, from a risk manager.
“The New York Times of August 18 described A Demon of Our Own Design, by Richard Bookstaber (see “Investment Miscellany,” November 2000) as pointing out that “the proliferation of complex financial products like derivatives, combined with use of leverage to bolster returns, will inevitably mean that there will be a regular stream of market contagions like the one we’re having now – one of which, someday, could be calamitous.” 6” — Howard Marks
Source: Now It’s All Bad?, page 6
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Fischer Black's life and ideas, from option pricing on, that shaped modern finance.
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Life on Salomon Brothers' bond trading floor in the 1980s mortgage-bond boom.
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Source: Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya
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Why global markets are unstable, written after the Asian and Russian crises.
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