
How a hedge fund's bond bets on borrowed money lost $4.6 billion in four months.
The canonical account.
Lowenstein reconstructs the founding, operation and 1998 collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, the hedge fund founded by Salomon Brothers bond trader John Meriwether with a partnership that included Nobel laureates Myron Scholes and Robert Merton. The fund returned over forty percent annually in its first years and then lost about 4.6 billion dollars in four months.
The strategy was convergence arbitrage: identifying small pricing differences between closely related securities, judging that they would converge, and applying enormous leverage to make small spreads meaningful. LTCM ran leverage above twenty-five to one on balance sheet, with much larger notional exposure through derivatives, and it obtained financing terms from banks that no other fund received, including trades with no haircut.
The failure sequence began with Russia's default in August 1998. Correlations that the models treated as independent moved together, liquidity disappeared, and the positions could not be exited because LTCM was the market in many of them. Counterparties knew the positions and traded against them. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York convened fourteen banks to recapitalise the fund in September to prevent forced liquidation.
Lowenstein is a journalist and the finance is explained clearly for non-specialists, sometimes at the cost of technical precision. The book is strongest on the partnership's internal culture, the arrogance toward counterparties, and the risk model's assumption that historical volatility and correlation would hold. Critics note that Lowenstein moralises about intellectual pride rather than analysing the market structure failures. The episode is the standard case study for leverage, liquidity and model risk.
Investors and risk managers who want the definitive case study on leverage, model risk and liquidity, applicable well beyond fixed income arbitrage.
Financial journalist and author; Wall Street Journal reporter for over a decade
Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist and When Genius Failed are the standard reference accounts of Buffett's rise and of the LTCM collapse.
“Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management (New York: Random House, 2000), 72”
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