
Papers explaining the 2007 crisis as a run on the repo and securitisation system.
2007-08 read as a classic run on repo, not on retail deposits.
Gary Gorton assembled this from papers he wrote during and immediately after the 2007 and 2008 crisis, including the widely circulated account he prepared for the Federal Reserve's Jackson Hole conference in 2008. It sets out his interpretation of the crisis as a banking panic in a banking system that regulators had not recognised as one.
His argument is that securitised banking, meaning the combination of loan origination, securitisation and repurchase agreement funding, performed the same economic function as traditional deposit banking: it created short-term debt that could be used as money because holders did not need to investigate its value. Repurchase agreements collateralised by securitised bonds were the deposits of this system, and institutional investors were its depositors. When subprime losses made the value of the collateral uncertain, holders raised haircuts, which is the equivalent of a withdrawal, and the resulting contraction forced asset sales that lowered prices further.
Gorton documents the growth of the repo market, the mechanics of haircuts, and the specific timing of the run in 2007. He argues that the crisis was not caused by subprime losses as such, which were too small to explain what happened, but by the loss of information insensitivity in the debt backed by them. The policy implication is that any system generating uninsured short-term debt will produce runs, and that regulation must address the debt's information properties rather than the underlying assets. The papers overlap with his later Misunderstanding Financial Crises, which states the argument more accessibly.
Investors and policymakers who want the primary papers behind the securitised banking run interpretation of the 2008 crisis.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
The 2007 to 2008 crisis was a bank run like the panics of the 19th century.
Interest rates from Babylonian lending through Rome and Europe to modern bonds.
“Courtesy of Homer and Sylla’s A History of Interest Rates, I’ve plotted the market price of the 5% prestiti in the 14th and 15th centuries: Even taking these stumbles into account, investors in medieval and Renaissance Europe earned healthy returns on their capital.” — William J. Bernstein
Source: Efficient Frontier, issue 901 (2001)
Recommended by: Mohnish Pabrai, William J. Bernstein
The 2008 crisis traced back 25 years to mortgage bonds, Fannie Mae and subprime.
“Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis (New York: Portfolio, 2010), 128-134” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Blaming the Rat: Incentives, Motivation, and How They Interact, page 14
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
How subprime lenders and Wall Street built the mortgage bubble and the crisis.
How a JPMorgan team invented credit default swaps that other banks then misused.
How the London money market worked, and why a central bank lends freely in a panic.
“The good times too of high price almost always engender much fraud,” wrote Walter Bagehot in Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1877).” — Jeremy Grantham
Source: Valuing AI: Extreme Bubble, New Golden Era - or Both?, page 13
Recommended by: Jeremy Grantham