
Why firms exist: transaction costs decide when to own rather than contract.
Nobel-winning theory of when to make rather than buy.
Oliver Williamson developed transaction cost economics and this book is its fullest statement. The question it answers is Ronald Coase's: why do firms exist at all, rather than everything being organised through market contracts.
Williamson's answer starts from two behavioural assumptions. People are boundedly rational, so contracts are necessarily incomplete and cannot specify what happens in every future state. And some people behave opportunistically, meaning they will exploit gaps in contracts when it pays. Given these, the critical variable is asset specificity: when a transaction requires an investment that has little value outside that particular relationship, the parties become locked in, and whoever made the specific investment is exposed to being held up by the other afterward.
From this he derives the make-or-buy decision. Transactions with low asset specificity are efficiently organised through markets, because competition disciplines suppliers and switching is cheap. Transactions with high asset specificity, high uncertainty and high frequency are efficiently organised inside a firm, because hierarchy can adapt without renegotiation. Intermediate cases produce hybrid forms including long-term contracts, franchising and joint ventures. He applies this to vertical integration, to labour organisation, to corporate governance and to antitrust, arguing that many practices condemned as anticompetitive are efficient responses to contracting problems. Williamson received a Nobel prize in 2009. The framework is criticised for the assumption of opportunism and for the difficulty of measuring asset specificity independently of the outcome it explains.
Executives making outsourcing and integration decisions and investors analysing vertical structure who want the theoretical basis for where firm boundaries should sit.
“Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: Free Press, 1985)”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Game theory applied to business, which is cooperative and competitive at once.
“Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: The Ecosystem Edge, page 10
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Mohnish Pabrai
Collected papers on agency theory and the forces that make corporations efficient.
A defence of American business on fraud, CEO pay, monopoly and tech, issue by issue.
How firms are organised, using agency, contracts and transaction-cost economics.
Industrial-organisation economics of brand choice and bilateral market power.
How large corporations run by a technostructure of experts plan rather than compete.
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