
Post-mortems on value-destroying mergers, from AOL Time Warner to Quaker and Snapple.
Why mergers fail; the break risk an arbitrageur underwrites.
Bruner studies mergers and acquisitions that destroyed large amounts of value, including AT&T and NCR, Sony and Columbia Pictures, Quaker Oats and Snapple, the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroad merger, Renault and Volvo, Tyco, and the AOL Time Warner combination. Each case gets a reconstruction of the decision process, the price paid, the integration attempt and the eventual write-off.
The analytical claim is that acquisition failure is rarely caused by a single bad judgement. Bruner treats deal failure as a systems problem, in which a complex business environment, tightly coupled execution, cognitive bias in the acquiring executives, and weak governance combine so that a shock which a simpler deal would absorb instead cascades. He explicitly borrows Charles Perrow's normal accident theory, arguing that certain deal structures are accident-prone by design. He also pushes back on the popular claim that most M&A destroys value, arguing the aggregate evidence shows target shareholders gain, acquirer shareholders roughly break even on average, and the losses are concentrated in a recognisable minority of deals.
For acquirers and their boards the practical output is a set of markers that predict trouble: paying with overvalued stock, bidding in a contested auction against a strategic rival, buying outside the core, integrating two organisations of similar size, and closing under time pressure. The academic literature Bruner surveys is now two decades old and the event-study evidence has been refined since, but the case reconstructions remain the strongest part and have not been superseded.
Board members, corporate development teams and investors assessing whether a proposed acquisition carries the structural markers of the deals that fail.
“Robert F. Bruner, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons That Rise Above the Ashes (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2005)”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Why acquirers overpay: the premium is a promise of gains most never deliver.
“Mark L. Sirower, The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition Game (New York: Free Press, 1997)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Cost of Capital and Capital Allocation: Investment in the Era of "Easy Money", page 15
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
Bain's study of 1,700 companies on the four decisions that make acquisitions work.
Eight CEOs who beat the market by allocating capital, not by running operations.
“…books I've recommended, highlighted to death, or forced on friends.” — Andrew Wilkinson
Source: Andrew Wilkinson's Bookshelf, neverenough.com
Recommended by: Andrew Wilkinson, Dan Loeb, Francois Rochon and 12 others
Value is discounted future cash flow, not earnings per share or return on equity.
“Alfred Rappaport, a professor emeritus at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, made this point clearly in his seminal book, Creating Shareholder Value.” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Market Share: Understanding Competitive Advantage Through Market Power, page 1
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Mohnish Pabrai
Why American executive pay is not set by arm's-length bargaining for shareholders.
“For the negative case see Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) and Lucian A” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Capital Allocation: Results, Analysis, and Assessment, page 65
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
How the chase for short-term share prices corrupted shareholder value, and fixes.
“Alfred Rappaport, Saving Capitalism from Short-Termism: How to Build Long-Term Value and Take Back Our Financial Future (New York: McGraw Hill, 2011), 69-88” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: The Importance of Expectations: The Question that Bears Repeating: What’s Priced in?, page 14
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Patrick O'Shaughnessy