
The research on intuitive judgement and its biases, collected.
Edited volume.
Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman edited this collection as the successor to the 1982 volume Judgment Under Uncertainty, gathering the research on intuitive judgement produced in the intervening two decades.
The organising development is the two-system framework. Kahneman and Frederick's chapter sets out the distinction between an intuitive system that produces rapid automatic responses and a deliberative system that monitors and sometimes corrects them, and introduces attribute substitution as the general mechanism behind heuristics: when asked a difficult question, people answer an easier related one without noticing the substitution. This framework organised the field and became the basis for Kahneman's later Thinking, Fast and Slow.
The collection extends the original heuristics. Representativeness, availability and anchoring are revisited with newer evidence and with the mechanisms specified more precisely, including the finding that availability operates through the experienced ease of retrieval rather than through the number of instances retrieved. New chapters cover the affect heuristic, in which an overall good or bad feeling substitutes for separate assessments of risk and benefit; support theory, which explains why unpacking a category into its components raises its judged probability; and the treatment of the outside view against the inside view in forecasting.
Other sections cover overconfidence and calibration, the illusion of validity, hindsight bias, motivated reasoning, cultural differences in judgement, and applications to medical, legal and financial decisions.
The collection is academic and consists of journal-style chapters. Some of the specific findings it collects have been affected by the replication problems that hit social psychology after 2011, particularly in the priming literature, though the core judgement findings on anchoring, availability, representativeness and overconfidence have replicated well. Thinking, Fast and Slow presents the same material for general readers.
Readers who want the primary research on intuitive judgement rather than a popular treatment, particularly anyone designing decision or forecasting processes.
Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Princeton University; Nobel laureate in economics 2002
Prospect theory and the heuristics-and-biases programme are the primary psychological foundation the whole of behavioral finance builds on.
“Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor, “The Affect Heuristic,” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 397-420”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Thirty-five papers on judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce.
“Research regarding this problem was originally presented in Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Evidential Impact of Base Rates,” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 153-160” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Cultivating Your Judgment Skills: A Framework for Improving the Quality of Decisions, page 13
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Adam Robinson
Unwanted variation in judgements that should match, and why organisations ignore it.
“Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony, and Cass R. Sunstein, Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment (New York: Little, Brown Spark, 2021), 156-158” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: The Impact of Intangibles on Base Rates, page 10
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
Papers on how people choose under risk, from prospect theory to framing.
How snap judgments work, when to trust them and when they mislead.
“Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Are You an Expert? Experts and Markets, page 9
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Mohnish Pabrai and 2 others
Whether clinical judgement or statistical formulas predict better in psychology.
“Paul E. Meehl, Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1954)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: BIN There, Done That: How to Reduce the Sources of Forecasting Error, page 14
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Daniel Kahneman
Four traps that ruin decisions, such as narrow framing, and a process to beat each.
“Interesting and insightful dive into the subject of how to make big decisions. Specific useful advice.” — Derek Sivers
Source: Derek Sivers book notes (primary, rated list) · Rating: 8/10
Recommended by: Andrew Wilkinson, Derek Sivers and 6 others