
Thirty-five papers on judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce.
Edited volume
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky assembled this collection of thirty-five papers in 1982, and it established the heuristics and biases programme as a field. The organising claim is that people making judgements under uncertainty do not compute probabilities; they substitute a small number of mental shortcuts that produce systematic and predictable errors.
Three heuristics carry most of the volume. Representativeness: people judge the probability that an object belongs to a category by how closely it resembles the category, which makes them ignore base rates, sample size and prior probability. Availability: people judge frequency by how easily instances come to mind, which makes vivid and recent events seem more common than they are. Anchoring and adjustment: people start from whatever number is present and adjust insufficiently. The collection also covers overconfidence in calibration studies, the illusion of validity, hindsight bias, the misperception of randomness, and applications to expert judgement in medicine, forecasting and risk perception.
The volume is a research collection, dense and repetitive by design, and readers wanting the argument should start with Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow. Some specific findings have not replicated well, and the field has been criticised for testing student subjects on artificial problems and for underweighting Gerd Gigerenzer's argument that many of the errors disappear when problems are stated in frequency format rather than probability format. The core findings on base rate neglect, overconfidence and anchoring have survived and are the empirical basis for most of what investors now call behavioural finance.
Investors and decision-makers who want the primary research behind behavioural finance rather than its popularised versions.
Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Princeton University; Nobel laureate in economics 2002
Prospect theory and the heuristics-and-biases programme are the primary psychological foundation the whole of behavioral finance builds on.
“Research regarding this problem was originally presented in Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Evidential Impact of Base Rates,” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 153-160”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
The research on intuitive judgement and its biases, collected.
“Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor, “The Affect Heuristic,” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 397-420” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Risk, page 5
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
Unwanted variation in judgements that should match, and why organisations ignore it.
“Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony, and Cass R. Sunstein, Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment (New York: Little, Brown Spark, 2021), 156-158” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: The Impact of Intangibles on Base Rates, page 10
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
Papers on how people choose under risk, from prospect theory to framing.
How snap judgments work, when to trust them and when they mislead.
“Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Are You an Expert? Experts and Markets, page 9
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Mohnish Pabrai and 2 others
Whether clinical judgement or statistical formulas predict better in psychology.
“Paul E. Meehl, Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1954)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: BIN There, Done That: How to Reduce the Sources of Forecasting Error, page 14
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Daniel Kahneman
Four traps that ruin decisions, such as narrow framing, and a process to beat each.
“Interesting and insightful dive into the subject of how to make big decisions. Specific useful advice.” — Derek Sivers
Source: Derek Sivers book notes (primary, rated list) · Rating: 8/10
Recommended by: Andrew Wilkinson, Derek Sivers and 6 others