Moneyball

Lewis follows the Oakland Athletics under general manager Billy Beane, a team with one of the lowest payrolls in baseball that repeatedly reached the playoffs by identifying players the market undervalued. The central argument is that the market for baseball players was inefficient because it priced traditional scouting judgments that did not predict run production.

The analytical content comes from Bill James and the sabermetric tradition. On-base percentage predicted run scoring better than batting average, and it was cheap because nobody valued walks. Defensive statistics were unreliable, so Oakland weighted them less. Stolen bases and sacrifice bunts destroyed expected runs more often than they created them. College players had larger and more reliable statistical records than high school players, which made them safer draft choices.

Lewis documents the internal resistance from scouts whose expertise was being displaced, the draft room arguments, and the acquisition of specific undervalued players including Scott Hatteberg, Chad Bradford and David Justice. The book's influence went far beyond baseball, into other sports and into business, where it became shorthand for using data against entrenched expert judgment.

The criticisms are substantial. Oakland's success depended heavily on three exceptional starting pitchers acquired through high draft picks, which the book underplays. The specific inefficiency in on-base percentage disappeared within a few years as other teams adopted the analysis, which demonstrates that the method rather than the metric was the lesson. Several scouts have disputed Lewis's portrayal. The team never won a World Series with this approach.

Financial journalist and author; former Salomon Brothers bond salesman

Liar's Poker, The Big Short and Flash Boys are the primary narrative sources later writers build on for Wall Street of the 1980s, the subprime crisis and high-frequency trading.

Vanity Fair, Salomon Brothers