Summary

Huntington argues that after the Cold War the principal source of international conflict would be cultural and religious rather than ideological or economic, and that world politics would be organised around a small number of civilisations rather than around nation states or blocs.

He identifies major civilisations including Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American and African, each defined by religion, language, history and institutions. His argument is that conflict concentrates along the boundaries between them, which he calls fault lines, and that states within a civilisation align with its core state.

His specific claims include that Western universalism is not universal and is perceived elsewhere as imperialism; that modernisation does not produce Westernisation and frequently produces a return to indigenous culture as societies become wealthier and more confident; that the West's relative power is declining as Asian economies grow and as demographic weight shifts; and that the most dangerous conflicts would involve Islamic and Sinic civilisations against the West and against each other. The book was written against Fukuyama's argument that liberal democracy had won permanently.

The criticisms are extensive. Edward Said and others argued that the civilisational categories are crude and internally contradictory, since more conflict occurs within these blocs than between them. The framework was used after 2001 to justify policy in ways that some argue made the thesis self-confirming. Amartya Sen argued that reducing people to a single civilisational identity is both wrong and dangerous. The observation that modernisation does not produce Westernisation has held up better than the civilisational blocs.

Key takeaways 8

Who should read it

Readers wanting the influential post-Cold War framework in its original form, aware that its categories are heavily contested and were used to justify policy.

Who recommended it 5 · 3 direct