
Computer tournaments of the prisoner's dilemma show why tit-for-tat wins.
Axelrod ran computer tournaments in which submitted strategies played the iterated prisoner's dilemma against each other, and this book reports what won and why.
The winner in both tournaments was tit-for-tat, submitted by Anatol Rapoport, which cooperates on the first move and then copies the opponent's previous move. It was the shortest programme submitted. Axelrod identifies four properties that characterised successful strategies: being nice, meaning never defecting first; being retaliatory, meaning responding to defection immediately; being forgiving, meaning returning to cooperation as soon as the opponent does; and being clear, meaning simple enough that the opponent can recognise the pattern and adapt to it.
His theoretical result is that cooperation can emerge among self-interested agents without central authority or trust, provided the interaction is repeated and the shadow of the future is long enough, meaning the participants weight future encounters sufficiently relative to present gains.
The empirical applications include the live and let live system that developed in First World War trench warfare, where units facing each other across static lines developed tacit restraint that commands had to break up by rotating troops, and biological examples of reciprocal altruism.
The work has been enormously influential across biology, political science and economics. Later research has qualified it: tit-for-tat performs poorly with noise, since a single misperception produces endless mutual retaliation, and variants including generous tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift do better in noisy environments.
Anyone designing repeated interactions, including negotiators, platform operators and partnership managers, who needs the conditions under which cooperation emerges.
“That clever but unsatisfying explanation eventually led me to the book and article that I'm recommending this year - The Evolution of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod, and a related journal article1 (jointly, "EoC").”
“Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)”
“For game theory, in addition to playing strategy games, you may want to try The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy by J.D. Williams and The Evolution of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod.”
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
Von Neumann, game theory and the prisoner's dilemma in nuclear strategy.
“For international relations, see William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma (New York: Doubleday, 1992)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: The Colonel Blotto Game: Transitivity and How to Win When You’re an Underdog, page 8
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin
Game theory without maths, with new examples: commitment, signals, bargaining.
“for business, see Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: The Colonel Blotto Game: Transitivity and How to Win When You’re an Underdog, page 8
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin, Marc Andreessen
Game theory without maths: look forward, reason back, and make threats credible.
“Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Measuring the Moat: Assessing the Magnitude and Sustainability of Value Creation, page 47
Recommended by: Jim Collins, Michael Mauboussin
History as a growing web of non-zero-sum games, in which both sides can gain.
“His book Nonzero is among my five favorite books of all time. So, that book came out recently, and I gave that to my closest friend and my family.” — Nick Thompson
Source: The Tim Ferriss Show Transcripts: Nick Thompson (#311)
Recommended by: Mohnish Pabrai, Nick Thompson, Ev Williams and 1 other
Conflict as bargaining: commitment, credible threats and focal points.
Recommended by: Naval Ravikant
The founding of game theory: expected utility and strategy among interacting players.
“John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944)” — Michael Mauboussin
Source: Competitive Advantage Period: The Neglected Value Driver
Recommended by: Michael Mauboussin