
Machiavelli's handbook on political strategy remains disturbing because it separates effectiveness from morality — a distinction every strategic thinker eventually has to confront. His analysis of how new rulers consolidate power is still the sharpest treatment of legitimacy under conditions of uncertainty.
Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513 after losing his position in the Florentine republic, as a treatise on acquiring and holding political power addressed to Lorenzo de Medici. Its method separates it from the political writing that preceded it: he describes how rulers actually behave rather than how they should behave, and states explicitly that a ruler who acts as morality prescribes among people who do not will be destroyed.
His practical positions include that it is safer to be feared than loved if you cannot be both, since love depends on the other party and fear depends on you; that a ruler must nonetheless avoid being hated, which comes from taking property and women rather than from severity; that cruelties should be committed all at once and benefits distributed gradually; that a new ruler must either conciliate or destroy those he displaces, since a wounded opponent takes revenge; that mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless because their interests are not aligned; and that a ruler must have his own arms.
He also discusses fortune and virtue, arguing that fortune governs roughly half of human affairs and that the remainder is available to a ruler who prepares in advance rather than responding to events.
The book's status is disputed. Some read it as a straightforward manual, some as satire, and some, following Rousseau, as a warning to republics disguised as advice to princes. Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy argues for republican government, which complicates any simple reading. Its business use is generally superficial. The genuinely useful element is the method of describing behaviour as it is rather than as it ought to be.
Readers who want the original text on power as practised rather than as justified, aware that its interpretation has been disputed for five centuries.
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