
The Good Judgment Project; the practices that measurably improve forecasts.
Tetlock reports the results of the Good Judgment Project, which competed in a four-year forecasting tournament run by IARPA against other university teams and against intelligence community analysts with access to classified material. Thousands of volunteers made specific probabilistic forecasts on geopolitical and economic questions with defined resolution criteria, scored by Brier score.
The finding is that a small group, roughly the top two percent, consistently outperformed, and that their performance persisted year to year, which rules out luck as the explanation. Tetlock calls them superforecasters and describes what they do: they break questions into components, start from base rates before considering case detail, gather evidence from multiple perspectives, update in small frequent increments as information arrives, use finely grained probability estimates rather than rounding to tens, and treat their own beliefs as hypotheses rather than as positions.
The book builds on Tetlock's earlier Expert Political Judgment, which found that credentialed experts forecast barely better than chance and that fame correlated negatively with accuracy. He uses Isaiah Berlin's hedgehog and fox distinction, with foxes who hold many partial models outperforming hedgehogs who apply one framework.
The practical content includes the finding that training in probabilistic reasoning improved accuracy by around ten percent, that teams outperformed individuals when structured to avoid conformity, and that most public forecasting is unfalsifiable by design because it lacks time frames and probability estimates. The limits are real. The tournament asked questions resolvable within months on geopolitical topics, and the transfer to longer horizons or to genuinely unprecedented events is unproven. Taleb has argued that the method works only where the underlying distribution is not fat-tailed.
Investors and executives who make explicit predictions and want a scoring discipline and a set of practices that measurably improve accuracy.
Canadian journalist who co-wrote Superforecasting with Philip Tetlock and How Big Things Get Done with Bent Flyvbjerg.
Superforecasting reports the Good Judgment Project tournament results and the habits that separated accurate forecasters: breaking questions into parts, updating in small increments, keeping score in numbers. How Big Things Get Done adds base-rate evidence from thousands of megaprojects on why budgets and schedules fail and what the successful ones did differently.
Chosen by shared topics, the entries that hold them, and the people who recommended both.
A 20-year test of 28,000 expert forecasts: foxes with many models beat hedgehogs.
“All pundits and commentators should publish their prediction track records, yet don't. What to pay attention to and what to ignore.” — Marc Andreessen
Source: @pmarca, 'Thread: Books I've recently read and recommend'
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Why people mistake luck for skill, above all in markets.
“Fooled by Randomness is a serious, intellectually sophisticated book, well worth reading carefully. At times, the book is condescending. Nevertheless, there are some great insights.” — Barton Biggs
Source: Biggs on a sophisticated book worth reading carefully
Recommended by: Barton Biggs, Michael Mauboussin and 11 others
Kahneman's synthesis of behavioral economics is the cognitive science underpinning every negotiation tactic. Anchoring, loss aversion, framing effects, and the planning fallacy — understanding why these biases operate, not just that they exist, makes you harder to exploit and more honest about your own irrationality.
“…books I've recommended, highlighted to death, or forced on friends.” — Andrew Wilkinson
Source: Andrew Wilkinson's Bookshelf, neverenough.com
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Rare, unforeseen, high-impact events drive history, explained only after the fact.
“The message of The Black Swan is how important it is to realize that the things everyone rules out can still come to pass.” — Howard Marks
Source: Oaktree memo 'The Limits to Negativism'
Recommended by: Howard Marks, Marc Andreessen, Nat Eliason and 18 others
Why some forecasts succeed and most fail, from weather to earthquakes and economics.
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Eight mistakes experienced decision-makers repeat, and a correction for each.
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